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Abstract
This paper discusses the ways in which a revolu­
tion inspired by Islam emerged in the few decades 
in West Africa, mainly through the intervention of 
Salafi actors, institutions, and reform practices. 
Salafism as an Islamic discourse became popular 
in the region at the end of the 20th century as Islam 
acquired a renewed interest and became a potent dis­
course, restructuring from within, formulating new 
political agendas and mobilising for social change 
and radical reconfigurations of social order. The pa­
per calls for attention to context, noting the vari­
eties of Salafism, while problematising the views 
promoters of this Islamic trend have expressed in 
relation to state institutions, in particular the se­
cular school system. Emphasising the role of the 
Salafi preacher, the paper argues that Salafism 
has had a crucial impact not only on the religious, 
but also on the public spheres. A social and poli­
tical critique, Salafism proves a major challenge 
while it promotes alternative moral and political 
orders including a Jihadi regime.
Concept and elements of context
How does Salafism as a reform discourse and 
practice affect social and political interactions in 
West Africa? How does it relate to established mo­
ral order and political regimes in the region? These 
basic questions are at the core of the attempts at 
analyzing Salafism this paper undertakes. What I 
refer to as Salafi in this context is a conglomera­
te of actors, discourses, and institutions which, in 
attempting to reform Muslim practices, have actu­
ally triggered a social and political process which 
is nothing short of revolution. Salafism restricts 
the authentic sources of Islam to the Qur’an and 
the tradition of the prophet Muhammad (Sunna). 
At the same time it insists on the oneness of Allah 
and following the model of Muhammad and his 
companions. It became popular in the region while 
Islam acquired a renewed interest and became a 
potent discourse, restructuring from within, for­
mulating new political agendas and mobilising for 
social change and even radical reconfigurations of 
social order. The manifestations of these new dyna­
mics are now spread across the Sahel­Sahara and 
can be seen in the religion­driven violence that 
has reached southward to countries such as Côte 
d’Ivoire. The demands and impositions of a new 
and radical order is what make Salafism revolu­
tionary.
As a conceptual construct, Salafism is both com­
plex and eclectic (Wiktorowicz 2006; Gilsaa 2015), 
building on various historical trajectories, inspi­
rational figures, social categories and models. It 
claims both to revive and follow Islamic practices 
based on the models of the forefathers (such as 
Salaf al Saleh). One of its core arguments is built 
around the rejection of what it views as unlawful 
innovation (bid’a) and destruction of the tradition 
as understood and practiced by the first three gen­
erations of Muslims. Somewhat restorative, Salafi 
efforts aim at maintaining the purity of practice 
and protecting Islam from destructive innovations 
(Kobo 2013; Iddrisu 2013; and Sounaye 2009). To 
this end, it promotes an anti­Sufi discourse and 
a de-Africanisation of Islam which takes ritual, 
theological, sociopolitical, and epistemological 
forms. Theologically, asserting the oneness of God 
(tawhid) against all forms of association with what 
are called African traditions and customs, it pro­
motes exclusive reliance on the scriptures, the 
Qur’an and the Hadiths, referred to in terms of Ki-
tab and Sunna. Ritually, it rejects and condemns 
Sufi practices such as tomb visitation and Mawlid 
(celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muham­
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mad), which it claims are mere bid’a. Socially, it en­
gages a social engineering activism that has now 
established across the region a network of commu­
nities and groups clearly redesigning polities and 
their relationship to major institutions such as the 
state. The political ideal of living together regard­
less of ethnic or religious identities, and which jus­
tifies the erection of the state as the main political 
institution, is increasingly problematic and clearly 
no longer given.
In most of West Africa, Salafism emerged and 
expanded mainly through da’wa (call to Islam) and 
Islamic learning institutions. As a mobilising plat­
form, preaching was a central piece of the Salafi 
da’wa supported by global Salafism, but also locally. 
From Senegal to Nigeria and Guinee to Ghana, 
the Graduates of Medina played a significant part 
in this development as they become in many con­
texts the agents of a Salafi mission (Kobo 2013; 
Loimeier 2012). Because of their financial resourc­
es that give them social and political influence, 
traders were also important vectors of Salafism, 
as they proved to be key figures of the trend and 
the first to adopt it. Grégoire (1993) and Warms 
(1992) make the same argument for two commer­
cial towns, Maradi in Niger and Sikasso in Mali, 
where, as in many other contexts, merchants and 
Ulama1 established an alliance, a pattern that is 
historically established in the expansion of Islam 
in Africa (Ostebo 2015; Sounaye 2009; Kane 2003).
Thus, if Salafism is a religious phenomenon, 
what makes it worth investigating is the fact that 
it brings new understandings of the world, society, 
and politics. In this sense, I will argue against a 
closure of the category of Salafism itself, noting 
that change and transformation are of its history. 
And like most historical constructs, it is not stable; 
it is subject to time and appropriations and there­
fore contextually defined. In West Africa, it provides 
new ways of engaging social and moral orders; and 
as I argue, it has become not only challenging, but 
revolutionary. The continuum Salafi­Jihadi could 
be discussed and still needs to be empirically con­
trasted and complicated, but there seems to be a 
clear connection between the Salafism that we see 
today and the jihadism triggered in the region by 
many factors, including the desire to emancipate 
from political regimes, combat westernisation, 
and end imperialism, both cultural and economic. 
What comes to mind in this context is the 19th cen­
tury jihads that transformed both the moral and 
the political economies of West Africa, especially 
in its most Islamised parts.
However, it is important to note that not all 
Salafi end up embracing violence and political 
1 Scholars who hold significant sociopolitical influence in 
Muslim context. There are also thought to be the spokes-
persons of the Islamic tradition.
activism.2 To draw a parallel with William James’ 
famous book (James 2013), West Africa illustrates 
aptly the varieties of Salafi experience. Salafism 
is not homogenous and Salafi are not a monolith­
ic entity. On the contrary, they are a spectrum 
and comprise groups, communities, and organ­
isations that identify as Salafi by claiming the 
Qur’an, the tradition of Muhammad (Hadith), and 
the fore fathers. At the same time, as a religious 
discourse and political view on the self and the so­
ciety, Salafism is too diverse to follow one script. 
Therefore, the reader should expect a degree of 
simplification in the present discussion. Actual­
ly, the idea is neither to present a complete and 
exhaustive picture of Salafism, nor to determine 
which Salafi is most authentic, but to point to some 
of Salafi major claims, features and what makes 
Salafism a significant factor in the life of millions 
of people across West Africa. The attempt is made 
to think beyond categories and research the ways 
in which Salafism has now become the ideology of a 
transformative process that affects social, cultural, 
political, and even economic institutions. For this 
reason and since a major goal of this paper is to 
shift attention to context, I would suggest that we 
examine Salafism through its agents and the dis­
course it articulates on both social and political 
institutions.
Approaching Salafism in context means then be­
ing aware of its varieties, contradictions, and frag­
mentations. But this also implies paying attention 
to interactions within and without Salafism itself. 
In that perspective, it is worth noting, for example, 
how Salafism relates to secularism, as one may 
see it in francophone West Africa (Holder 2014; 
Diouf 2013), where laïcité, French secularism, has 
been at the core of state ideology, and central to 
Islam­related controversies in the last three dec­
ades. At some point, we don’t even need mention 
secularism, but look only at the sharianisation de­
bates across the region, the different forms they 
have taken and the implications these formula­
tions have had for policymaking and for Islam. Ob­
viously, secularism and  sharianisation are relat­
ed as illustrated by the case of Nigeria where the 
two issues have taken formal politico-institutional 
dimen sions with the adoption of Shari’a as state 
law across the Muslim north (Kendhammer 2016; 
Ostien 2007; Harnischfeger 2008; Chesworth and 
Kogelmann 2013). But, in other countries, too, sha­
rianisation has been at the center of public debate 
and a mobilising motive for what I call the Islamic 
civil society, a conglomerate of organisations and 
actors – generally authorised by the state, but not 
always – which aim to influence governance, espe­
2 Hence the category Salafi-Jihadi which refers specifically 
to the groups similar to those which fight the state in North­
ern Mali and Nigeria. An abundant literature already exists 
on that dimension of Salafism in West Africa. 
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cially by rejecting what it views as un-Islamic or 
even anti­Islamic norms and values. Mali, Niger, 
and Senegal are countries where the Islamic civil 
society has become influential and vied to defend 
Islam against attempts at reforming and codifying 
family law it viewed as too secular (Brossier 2016, 
2004; Sounaye 2005; and Miran 1998).
Salafism developed and is carried out within a 
web of relations which affect and inform societal 
power structures. For one thing, it has become a 
discourse of dissent, the voice of the discontented 
and one of the main modes of protest. But, it has 
also become the framework of imagining the fu­
ture of oneself and the community. How Salafism 
relates to social and political environment, includ­
ing other religious discourses is important to ana­
lyze in order to grasp the significance of this trend 
in contemporary West Africa. Emphasising its re­
lations means also looking at this trend in its var­
ious manifestations, including political, economic, 
societal and cultural, that is, looking beyond the 
exclusive confines of the religious as traditionally 
understood.
Obviously, there will not be enough space in this 
paper to elaborate on all the dimensions of Salaf­
ism I have sketched out. I will limit my examination 
to only a few points which help illustrate the shift­
ing paradigm that comes with the socio political 
and cultural transformation processes this trend 
has triggered. I will equate this whole process to a 
revolution which managed to make religiosity a ma­
jor factor in social interactions, political agendas, 
and life aspirations. In fact, Salafism introduces a 
reform which has clearly revolutionised not only re­
ligious practices, but also how people simply live, 
think about themselves and their institutions, and 
construct others. Setting up a new universe of dis­
course, it has produced a paradigm that redefines 
almost all aspects of public and personal lives.
The invitation is therefore to open an eye on 
religiously inspired processes that shape social, 
political, and cultural dynamics in Africa. While 
these processes affect everyday life, they are also 
changing the meaning of Islam and being Muslim, 
particularly among youth and women in the re­
gion. These developments have major implications 
for governance, coexistence, and the future of the 
state in the region. Compared to the 19th century 
Jihads (Lovejoy 2016; Robinson 2000; Hiskett 1994; 
Last 1967), contemporary appropriations of Islam 
through political Salafism have to deal with a ma­
jor institution, the modern state, which, in addi tion 
to its universalist discourse of citizenship, law, 
and order, usually claims the power to dominate 
or regulate all political subjects and bodies. But, 
it is one thing to have power, and another thing to 
have the authority to govern. The ongoing devel­
opments that come out of the appropriations and 
forms of Salafism in Africa and across the globe, 
speak to the current reality of the political terrain. 
What I will point to as a link, however, is the con­
tinuities and the ruptures that have shaped jihadi 
aspirations. The 19th and 21st centuries are dif­
ferent times, and, to some extent, raise different 
questions and show different modus operandi; but 
they have similar preoccupations.
One important thing that the last two decades 
demonstrate in West Africa is certainly the fact 
that religion, or more precisely Salafism, has not 
only gained visibility; it has become a dominant 
force and a powerful resource. The Shari’a con­
troversy, the morality debate, the  »Islamic state«  
issue, and the search for a pious subject and com­
munity are all instantiations of a desire to be dif­
ferent, a cry for an alternative, and an aspiration 
to emancipate from incapacitating and alienating 
social, political, and cultural structures. It is from 
that perspective that I understand the develop­
ment of Salafism in the region as transformative 
of the ways in which people conceive of their be­
ing individuals, collective bodies, and citizens of 
a state. This, I contend, is a revolutionary process 
that is reshaping Islam, but may also end up affect­
ing the political configuration of the region, both 
its conceptual and geographical maps, and even 
the future of the state.
In other words, while it is important to show 
that Salafism has grown into a political, cultural, 
and societal factor, how it translates and acquires 
materiality in historical context is, for example, 
one of the most important questions. As Boko 
Haram has captured the attention of the media 
and has become today the center of most of the 
talk about Islam in the region, we must not forget 
that it is only one of the multiple possible outcomes 
of Salafism. It is one among many possibilities. 
Under standing Boko Haram, for example, is very 
important, but understanding the ways in which 
it becomes central and is appropriated for diverse 
reasons, and in very different ways seems to me 
even more crucial. This is a question that one can­
not afford to overlook if one seeks to understand 
developments in the Sahel and West Africa, and 
possibly in the global context today. 
In the remainder of the paper, I discuss what 
I term the Salafi challenge, the way in which 
Salafi becomes problematic and unavoidable, not 
only as a discourse that articulates a critique of 
the society and other Islamic practices, but as a 
game changer which entered the religious and the 
public arena to stay. The challenge lies not only 
in what Salafism says, but how it does things and 
orga nises itself. In the second section, I move to 
examine the case of preaching and preachers and 
how they have become central figures of the Salafi 
revolution. Numerous preachers across the region 
could help illustrate the point here. Focusing on 
Albani, a popular Salafi figure in Zaria, Nigeria, 
I show how he exemplifies the Salafi religious 
entre preneur whose preoccupation is to engineer 
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a new order. Then, in a third section, I introduce 
the notion of the Salafi moral order, highlighting 
how the Salafi project intends to form a new so­
ciety, a new subject, and an alternative sociopo­
litical order. In the current context, a discussion 
on moral order can hardly do without factoring in 
the state and its various, complicated, and ambiva­
lent perceptions and status. This brings to the fore 
the issue of jihad. The fourth section of the paper 
then attempts to map some key ideas and positions 
that have emerged in relation to the state and its 
status in the current sociopolitical configuration, 
in particular with the experience of boko3. Thus 
instead of keeping the discussion to the organisa­
tion which has become well known because of its 
radical approach, I attempt to complicate the issue 
by introducing boko as a social category, a cultural 
model, and a political regime.
The Salafi challenge
There is no doubt that one of the key developments 
with Islam in West Africa has been the emergence 
of Salafi actors who have challenged the social or­
der across the region. This process is better under­
stood by focusing on their interventions in politi­
cal debates and their push for democratisation of 
religious authority, but also in the ways they have 
become social entrepreneurs, seeking to build 
communities in opposition established orders and 
hierarchies. Izala, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, MU­
JAO4 illustrate this development. 
As in many parts of the Muslim world, in West 
Africa, too, one needs take into consideration the 
Saudi factor and the conflict Sufi/Salafi or the 
Shia/Sunni opposition, which are part of global dy­
namics (Sirriyeh 1999). In the Sahara­Sahel region 
in particular, part of the reality of Salafism is the 
loss of confidence in sources of norms and values 
that until recently proved to be successful and ef­
fective in maintaining order. Religious ideas have 
their social life and as such, are affected by both 
processes of reproduction of social institutions 
and ideological shifts. The rise of Salafism in West 
Africa has followed diverse and differen tiated 
paths, as already noted. However, it will suffice 
here to say that when dissatisfaction arose in the 
3 Boko here refers to the western­educated elite and its 
norms. In Hausa context, it is also associated with secular­
ism.
4 Ansar Dine is a jihadi organisation operating mainly in 
northern Mali and which emerged in 2012 out of the recon­
figuration of the jihadi forces following the collapse of the 
state in Libya. It is said to be dominated by ethnic Tuareg. 
MUJAO, Mouvement pour l’Unicite du Jihad en Afrique de 
l’Ouest, operating along the border regions of Mali, Burkina 
Faso and Niger. However, one should note that this process 
is not exclusive to Islam because across West Africa, Chris­
tianity too has become a major mobilising force, a counter- 
power and transformative factor (cf. Meyer 2015, Piot 2010, 
Marshall 2009)
1990s, Salafism became one of the major religious 
discourses to cash in, portraying the world and the 
order it offers as the best alternative now and in 
the future. In fact, when the state failed to pro­
vide social services, Salafi organisations stepped 
in to »serve people«, as a preacher in Ouagadou­
gou, Burkina Faso, observes. Many organisations, 
sometimes with international support, developed 
initiatives that provided water, mosques, educa­
tion (such as madrasa, scholarships, reading ma­
terials, etc.), food and healthcare, in both rural 
and urban areas. But, one tells only part of the sto­
ry with these limited materialistic and utilitarian 
expla nations.
Political rearrangement of economic orders 
following the 1980s Structural Adjustment Pro­
grammes (SAP) and neoliberal measures to liber­
alise, open­up, and leave the economy to private 
investments, cut funding for education, promote 
competition, etc. The state exiting these domains 
created a vacuum that civil society, comprising 
also influential religious organisations and actors, 
quickly found ways to fill. I have used the cate­
gory of Islamic civil society to refer to that seg­
ment of organisations and associations that aspire 
to check governance and hold the state and the 
govern ment accountable on religious grounds, 
referring to Islamic principles. In more than one 
case, these claims and aspirations have structur­
ally changed the Islamic sphere; they have also 
transformed Muslim politics, in particular how 
Muslims interrelate, as well as how they relate 
to other religious traditions, state officials, and 
foreigners. They have even affected how Muslims 
situate themselves in regional and global contexts 
while setting new stages and standards for politics 
and governance.
Salafi are not only well connected regionally; 
they also project themselves beyond their local 
contexts, establishing networks, and becoming 
models of how to live and operate in a global con­
text. Many Salafi of West Africa, for example, are 
well connected to Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Egypt 
(Ahmed 2015), becoming local figures of a global 
religious discourse that seeks to counter its tra­
ditional foe, Sufism, but also new actors such as 
the Shia, the Pentecostals, and the Ahmadiyya. It 
is worth noting, for example, how the rivalry be­
tween Saudi Arabia and Iran is gradually reshaping 
the Islamic sphere in Nigeria and in Mali, as local 
Salafi and Shia become proxies in a global war of 
words. Under such circumstances, Salafi have be­
come actors in and between many places, constant­
ly remaking and reworking their connections. They 
enjoy transnationalism and trans locality.5
5 Many preachers and Muslim actors, from the region but 
also from other regions (North Africa, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Central Africa) have built on that disposition.
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Highly mobile, Salafi crisscross borders and have 
also become media savvy. Their mediation strate­
gies have radically changed while their means of 
communication have diversified, allowing them to 
escape the controlling eye and hand of state insti­
tutions. As a result, the mobile phone, for example, 
has become a powerful tool capable of disrupting 
the logic of the state. Media houses such as Sunna 
TV, a channel that promotes Salafism globally and 
one of the most active in West Africa, have clear­
ly complicated the forms, but also the content of 
broadcasting in the region that have made govern­
ing the Salafi subject challenging, for both state 
and social institutions.
In fact, one of the first targets of the Salafi 
discourse was the gerontocratic order which un­
til recently informed the social organisation of 
Islam in most of the region. Rejuvenating the 
Islamic sphere, this discourse has also introduced 
new institutions which have now inscribed various 
socio political dynamics to the region. In reac tion 
to these and similar developments, several coun­
tries (Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and 
Mauritania) have designed and launched training 
programmes for preachers and Imams, whose re­
newed political and social influence state govern­
ance has to reckon with. 
Theorisations of these developments have ar­
gued as if the Salafi were autonomous agents, 
occluding the fact that they are part of the soci­
ety and often agents of the state administration. 
In any case, how to deal with Salafi rhetoric, but 
also how to accommodate Salafi expectations and 
aspirations, seems to be a key preoccupation for 
states and governments, but they have certainly 
not developed efficient strategies and policies to 
this end. In the last four years, initiatives from the 
states in the region, the United Nations, and Europe 
have sought to counter Salafi­Jihadi violence and 
restore the rule of state institutions and lawful or­
der. Because law and order are no longer given, 
states have had to develop new approaches and 
policies. Security concerns have been at the center 
of these policies, especially with Boko Haram in 
the Lake Chad region, and MUJAO and Aqmi in 
Niger, Mali, Algeria, Burkina Faso and Maurita­
nia. But the Salafi challenge transcends security 
and includes basic daily concerns.
My framing of the Salafi challenge in the terms 
I have privileged so far is an attempt at compre­
hending new, Islam­related developments in West 
Africa, as Salafism conquers terrain and becomes 
a major player in the cultural and sociopolitical 
life of the region. A conclusion easily drawn is that 
Salafism has been transformative of social norms, 
political discourse, and cultural interaction. At the 
same time, it has created a new way of thinking 
about present and future West African societies. 
Its embrace of violence has spotlighted a region 
that is increasingly militarised, especially as both 
Europe and the USA have cast the region as a ma­
jor breeding ground for terrorism. That the Sahel 
has become a topic in geopolitical discourse is evi­
dent; but the basis of this status is the Salafi chal­
lenge and what it has introduced as new dynamics.
Once appropriated and invested in political pro­
jects, Salafism has appeared very much disruptive 
of the logic of the state, especially its social and 
political dynamics, while setting new (dis)orders. 
The claim of bringing a God­sanctioned order and 
a law abiding community is one of the recurrent 
discursive devices that made the popularity of 
Salafism. Appealing to many, especially disenfran­
chised citizens disappointed by the state, it chal­
lenges established orders and promises freedom, 
emancipation, and autonomy. Youth and women 
become carriers or agentive power (Alidou 2005) 
as never seen before. In northern Nigeria, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, or Senegal, the articulation of 
these promises of a better future has had a major 
impact on what I will refer to here as epistemic 
communities, those groups and circles that build 
on learning and knowledge in their attempts to es­
tablish a new social order (Kobo 2012; Miran 2006; 
Brenner 2001; Amselle 1985). Jihadism in northern 
Mali from 2012 and sharianisation in northern Ni­
geria at the beginning of the 2000s, are distinc­
tive marks of this trend that has made the quest 
for this new order a political matter. Within Mus­
lim contexts, Salafism galvanises and provides a 
purpose for life and existence that more and more 
Muslims no longer find in traditional institutions. 
The Ibadou Rahmane discourse in the outskirts 
of Dakar illustrates this feature. A reform project 
and powerful conceptual resource, Salafism has 
helped Muslims frame their worlds, actions, and 
desire to be modern, and helped them make sense 
of the ideological, moral, and material conditions 
of their lives. In these ways, Salafism has reener­
gised Islamic reform and the religious spheres in 
general.6 
But, of course, once we look beyond the regional 
focus of this paper, ISIS and Al Shebaab are illus­
trations of the tendency to seek a new political or­
der, too. How contemporary Salafism has affected 
dynamics within the Islamic tradition, and affect­
ed Muslim and global politics, are questions grad­
ually getting scholarly attention (Cavatorta and 
Merone 2016; Bonnefoy 2012; Lauzière 2015). In 
relation to West Africa, perhaps one of the institu­
tions to look at is preaching and its professionals.
Preaching Salafism: Albani and his Salafiyya da’wa 
In Africa, there is probably no country were 
preachers have thriven like Nigeria. The anec dote 
is that through their efforts religion has taken over 
6 Scholars have discussed these dimensions in various 
ways. (Umar 1993; Gregoire 1993; LeBlanc 2000; Dumbe 
2013; Kobo 2013; Iddrisu 2012)
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oil as the primary export­product of the Nigeri­
an economy. But then, United Nations must have 
their numbers wrong since they hardly consider 
religious goods and markets in their statistics. For 
anyone familiar with recent developments in West 
Africa, this characterisation makes sense and cer­
tainly illustrates the significance of what may be 
termed a religious rent, in the last twenty years. 
In Muslim context, the number of preachers has 
multi plied since the 1990s and particularly after 
the 2000s, following the adoption of Shari’a as a 
state law in northern Nigeria and the reenergised 
Saudi religious diplomacy. Although all Islamic 
trends have regularly used sermons to promote 
their ideas and agendas, the most active and dy­
namic are the Salafi who quickly became the face 
of religion in the public sphere and the voice of 
the people as they claim authenticity and therefore 
legitimacy. I recall conversations in Zaria in 2015 
during which my interlocutors suggested that in 
Northern Nigeria, politics start and end with re­
ligion. This may not be always the case, but it is 
certainly a distinctive mark of Nigeria, in both 
Muslim and Christian contexts. A similar formu­
la could certainly apply, for example, to Senegal 
(Diouf 2013).
What is striking is how voicing authenticity and 
defending Islam have become the task and the 
obligation of preachers, many of whom have, for 
that reason, acquired the status of pop stars. In 
Nigeria, the story of the political preacher goes 
back at least to the Izala movement with its two 
charismatic figures, Sheikh Abubakar Gumi and 
Idriss Ismail (Ben Amara 2013; Loimeier 2011), the 
founding fathers of the Salafi movement, who have 
in many ways shaped the course of this trend in 
Nigeria and to some extent in West Africa. What 
started with Izala led to Boko Haram, the most me­
diated of all Salafi organisations in West Africa to­
day. Because of the indiscriminate killings added 
to its already violent rhetoric, Boko Haram has be­
come known worldwide essentially because it took 
into the political arena issues that were floating in 
the society and adopted tactics and modes of oppo­
sition never seen before. Thus, it is not enough to 
say that Boko Haram is a jihadi organisation; one 
needs to add how it captures Muslim dissent and 
the modes through which it expresses and mobi­
lises it. Most Muslims in the region, in particular, 
have rejected Boko Haram tactics, many going as 
far as to delegitimise it as Islamic and disown it as 
local. Many have also described it as the product of 
Western, French, or American conspiracies against 
Muslims, Nigeria, and Islam. Regardless, what is 
clearly visible and documented is that preaching 
is at the root of its emergence, including its call 
to reinstate authentic practice of Islam exempli­
fied by the first Muslim community that formed 
around the Prophet Muhammad. Functionaries of 
da’wa and cadres of a new moral order, preachers 
have become influential agents of a movement am­
bitious to spread Salafism and make it the region’s 
primary ideological frame. Preachers took the 
lead of what I have already termed the Salafi chal­
lenge, as they illustrate the transformative power 
of preaching in contemporary West Africa (Miran 
1998; Savadogo and Gomez-Perez 2011).
To understand the significance of preaching in 
this context, one has to look at individual preach­
ers, especially how they establish themselves as 
voices of Islam and promoters of a religiously in­
spired moral order. I propose to discuss the case 
of a charismatic Salafi figure known as Sheikh 
Muhammad Awal Albani, who emerged in Zaria, 
Nigeria, at the end of the 1990s and quickly be­
came the epitome of the Salafi preacher. Caught 
up in several polemics and controversies, he was 
a challenge to virtually any form of authority in 
Zaria and northern Nigeria. Thus, when he was 
gunned down on February 1, 2014 on his way back 
home from a nightly sermon he delivered in his 
hometown of Zaria, many of his followers were not 
surprised. They had imagined such a tragedy hap­
pening, and the only question was when. Among 
Salafi, the act was the culmination of a series of 
killings that targeted spokespersons of a trend 
that had become dominant, and, for many religious 
and political authorities, simply inconvenient. In 
fact, before Albani, several preachers had already 
been assassinated (Thurston 2016b; Bala 2014; 
Brigaglia 2012), silenced for good, as one of my in­
terlocutors in Yola, Nigeria, argued.
Perhaps in no context other than Nigeria has 
the rise of Salafi resulted in such radical modus 
operandi. To silence criticism or eliminate a com­
petitor on the open market of ideas, assassination 
became the ultimate weapon. Albani’s case illus­
trates the significance preaching has acquired in 
contemporary Muslim societies, in particular in 
Sub­ Saharan Africa, as da’wa becomes the prima­
ry medium for religious activism. To promote their 
anti­Sufism, Salafi have focused on this Islamic 
institution which helped them popularise theolo­
gies and political views primarily directed against 
the most organised Islamic trend in the region: 
Sufism. In Niger, Nigeria, Ghana, and Cameroon, 
they used this hostility to build their communi­
ties and carve a space for themselves. Preaching 
proved instrumental in those contexts, for Salaf­
ism would not have spread as it did across West 
Africa without this practice.7
For Sheikh Albani Zaria, as for the model he 
emulated, Sheikh Nasir al-Din al-Bani (d. 1999), the 
famous Syrian­born Salafi and Hadith scholar, from 
whom the former picked up the nickname Albani, 
the science of Hadith is the mother of all sciences. 
7 Obviously, the same could be said of Pentecostals, for 
whom preaching has also become a primary technology of 
public making in West Africa.
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This explains why Albani named his headquarters 
the Dar al Hadeeth. Hadith open in practice by in­
forming about the ways in which Muhammad lived 
a paradigmatic life. In Nigeria Albani managed 
to establish himself as one of the most respected 
scholars of Hadith. In his arguments and disputes, 
he has constantly resorted to that expertise, pro­
moting more reliance on that source of Islamic 
norms in Nigeria and West Africa. When he got 
entangled in an argument with the ulama and the 
traditional authority of Serkin Zazzau in Zaria, he 
was summoned to an assembly and asked to pres­
ent his claims and provide justification for per­
forming the Friday congregational prayer in the 
morning instead of early afternoon, as people usu­
ally do in Zaria and across Muslim Africa. On that 
occasion, many accused him of inciting unrest and 
corrup ting their children, and demanded that he 
be forced to renounce his alternative practices and 
conform to tradition. An indefatigable preacher who 
had become popular beyond Nigerian borders, he 
continued to challenge social, political, and reli­
gious order until his death. In Niger and Nigeria, 
for example, his sermons are among the most lis­
tened to and shared within Salafi circles.
As Albani’s community shows, Salafism is not 
only a rhetoric or a set of apprehensions and mus­
ings. It is an engagement with the world and its 
politics. It is a social formation8 and as such, needs 
social materiality. Thus, for Salafism to establish 
itself, it needs to be socially produced and main­
tained. Again, preaching played a key role in that 
process. It proved instrumental for Albani’s com­
munity, in the making of the Izala movement, and 
in the rise of many Muslim leaders across West Afri­
ca (cf. Holder 2012, Schulz 2011, Sounaye 2009). One 
needs only look at Mohamed Yusuf, the founder of 
Boko Haram, or Ahmadou Koufa of Mali9, who have 
used preaching to establish and expand their com­
munities, in particular against what they viewed 
as state corruption and injustice. Similar cases 
could be made about Senegal, Burkina and Ghana 
(Gomez-Perez and Madore 2013; Dumbe 2013).
Perhaps more than any other charismatic 
preacher in the Hausa speaking Africa, Albani was 
convinced of the necessity of preaching to »change 
Muslim behavior and protect Islam« (Albani, ser­
mon Matasa, no date). Hence his social entrepre­
neurship and efforts to set up a community in 
Zaria for what he called da’wa salafiyya. In a local 
context dominated by rivalry among religious tra­
ditions and groups, part of Albani’s ambition was 
to contribute to the grandeur of Islam and unify 
Muslims, reconciling them against the »enemies 
8 Group, community.
9 Yusuf was killed by the Nigerian army in July 2009. In 
2015, Koufa founded the jihadi group Front de libération du 
Macina in Mali.
of Islam and northern Nigeria«, as he puts it (Al­
bani, sermon bid’a, no date). Beyond Nigeria, his 
Salafism promoted pan­Islamism, laying an elab­
orate discourse on »Algeria’s so-called democrati­
sation« as he points to the »injustice Muslims are 
subject to in that country« (Albani, sermon Mata­
sa). This is a reference to the 1990s »revocation of 
the victory« of the Front Islamic du Salut (FIS), the 
Islamist political party whose banning propelled 
Algeria into a continuing cycle of violence. Pales­
tine, Saudi Arabia, and the Shia, the other foe of 
Albani’s Salafism, were all central topics of his 
preaching.
Theologically and socially, Albani promoted an 
uncompromising Salafism that stresses the need 
for Muslims to emancipate themselves from an 
international and imperialist order. In calling the 
faithful to follow in the footsteps of Muhammad 
and the Pious Forefathers, he promotes a Mus­
lim nationalism and targets international organ­
isations such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO), which he accused of having an anti­Muslim 
agenda. For example, he played a major role in the 
anti­polio immunisation campaigns in the 2000s 
as the WHO and the Nigerian Government teamed 
up to eliminate the virus. Then, Albani was also 
caught in several controversies as he claimed that 
the polio immunisation campaigns were actually 
an operation to spread infertility among Muslims. 
Outspoken on various other social and political is­
sues, he was courted by local authorities, traders, 
and political leaders seeking to gain his support in 
both local and general elections.
In a dynamic field dominated by communitarian­
ism, Albani stands as a loner, exemplifying a type 
of religious entrepreneurship that goes beyond the 
classical model of the ulama and at the same time 
contradicting the Izala model, which had been the 
region’s first and most significant Salafi organisa­
tion. Albani constantly rejected invitations to take 
part in the Izala movement, although on various 
occasions he claimed to share the same creed and 
ethos with Izala. 10 For him, authentic Islam, i.e. 
Salafiyya, had nothing to do with Kungiya (associ­
ation), a model of organisation exemplified by the 
Izala and the Sufi organisations. Organisations do 
not serve the unity of Islam; on the contrary, they 
divide Muslims, he argued. In fact, he thought he 
was proven right with the fragmentation of the Iza­
la movement that started at the end of the 1980s 
and continued through the 1990s and resulted in 
Boko Haram. Undeterred, he associated Boko Har­
am with an unacceptable corruption of Salafism.
One of the features of Salafism that scholars 
have emphasised is precisely the fact that it is 
both global and local (Meijer 2009; Ostebo 2015). 
Preachers have contributed significantly to make 
10 He also refused to be part of the Ulama council of Zaria.
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this so. West Africa easily serves to document that 
phenomenon. While I focus on Albani in this sec­
tion, it is evident that part of his popularity can 
only be understood in situating him in his local 
context, but at the same time by examining him 
as a re gional actor. Albani finds inspiration in fig­
ures of Salafism beyond West Africa (cf. his nick­
name) and in the 19th century Jihadi movement 
that brought the Sokoto Caliphate. The founder of 
this theocracy, Usman Dan Fodio and his family, 
and the jihadism that dominated the 19th century 
West Africa are frequent references in his sermons. 
This local model of a polity where Islam became the 
major source of norms for the region inspired Alba­
ni’s political imagination and action, in particular 
his social engineering efforts to build a communi­
ty. Interestingly, he is not a Graduate of Medina, 
the model that has been instrumental in spreading 
Salafism in West Africa in the last two decades.
The point here is that the power of the word and 
the symbolic weight of religion, or the claims of re­
ligiosity, have given preachers the opportunity to 
engineer communities and to influence, if not initi­
ate, political change. As I have suggested above, Al­
bani’s influence has earned him more than sympa­
thy and supporters. In Zaria, his harsh criticism of 
political authorities, other religious communities, 
in particular the Tariqa, the Shi’a whose headquar­
ters are in the same city, and Boko Haram, have 
regularly put him under the spotlight (Thurston 
2016a, 2016b; Sounaye, forthcoming). Resolute and 
fearless critique of political practice and the Nige­
rian Federal government, Albani exemplified the 
Salafi preacher who challenges established orders 
and champions a new awakening of Islam and Mus­
lims for an era of Qur’anic rule, Zamanin al Qur’ani.
Taken within this socioreligious context, what 
Albani encapsulates is a trend of democratisa­
tion of religious discourse and authority, the com­
ing of age of a generation of Muslim figures who 
build their influence by protesting and challeng­
ing conventions of the state and traditional pow­
er structures. In other terms, what is striking is 
how Salafi communities have gradually built not 
only organisations, but communities they rely on 
to promote an anti­establishment discourse. They 
have appropriated the democratic ethos of free­
dom of speech and religion to promote alternative 
orders. Interestingly, many of these alternative 
groups and communities have related to the state 
and the political sphere only in antagonistic terms. 
Salafism in many ways grew out of the engage­
ment with these new realities of political society 
and the religious and public spheres. It took shape 
in that context of liberalisation and along the way, 
diversified, fragmented, and, as the trendy con­
cept puts it, radicalised. It challenges traditional 
configurations of power and champions qualitative 
and radical changes as it gradually remakes both 
habitats and habitus, to borrow Meyer’s formula.11 
In the end, and going back to my main argument, 
we must note that Salafism and its charismatic 
spokespersons have become popular not only be­
cause they are protestant voices, but also because 
they embody a revolutionary trend and the prom­
ise of a new political rule and moral order which, 
in many cases, focuses of the modern state.
The Salafi moral order: a revolution that comes 
through reform
Salafi presence and initiatives in the public arena 
across West Africa have transformed social dy­
namics and state governance. Current anxieties 
with security and violent jihadism do not belie 
this assessment. On the contrary, they confirm the 
ways in which Salafism has significantly affected 
interactions and seeks to establish a new moral 
order. What I call the Salafi moral order here is 
simply the value system which takes Salafism as 
the ultimate reference point for individual behavi­
or, governance, and social interactions. The prin­
ciples for this order address four main questions: 
What is right? What is good? What is appropriate? 
And what is just? They constitute the moral basis 
that governs human choice and political action. 
Even though Salafi are minority among Muslims 
in West Africa, it is important to note that in many 
contexts, they have managed to set a powerful mo­
ral agenda which aspires to rule all domains of so­
cial life. Its search for defining the truth and the 
common good has been to some extent successful. 
I am referring not only to Jihadists who claim Sala­
fism, but also to the various organisations, groups, 
and communities that have adopted this Islamic 
reform discourse simply for themselves, with no 
interest in imposing it onto others. Let’s not for­
get that among Salafi, there are certainly Jihadi 
who found in violence a means to achieve political 
change; but there are also quietists who abhor vio-
lence and argue that the use of violence to pro­
mote Islam is un­Islamic.
Two of the ways Salafism was able to create and 
impose this moral order are transnationalism and 
translocalism, as I have already noted with Albani. 
But these features are not exclusive to Salafism. 
Many other Muslim trends and organisations are 
known for operating and dealing beyond their lo­
cal contexts and outside of the state realm, often 
negating state borders and contradicting its logic. 
Thus, in their quest to reform Islam and Muslim 
practices, Salafi have heavily relied on transnation­
alism (Ahmed 2015; Dumbe 2013). Trans locality 
defines Islam in Africa, in particular among Sufi, 
both before and with the advent of the state (Loi­
meier 2003).
11 See, https://www.zmo.de/forschung/projekte_2008_ 2013 
/ Habitats_Habitus_e.html, accessed August 22, 2017
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In his documentary, Devoir de Mémoire (2014), 
on the Jihadi takeover in Northern Mali in 2012, 
Mamadou Kotiki Cissé shows a young Boko Har­
am fighter who claims to have come from Northern 
Nigeria to support the freshly established Jihadi 
rule. Ahmed (2015) notes the longstanding net­
works of Salafism between Saudi Arabia and West 
Africa. The roots of intellectual Salafism have also 
sprouted in West Africa, from Niger to Libya or 
Cameroon to Northern Nigeria, relying on new 
learning institutions and pedagogy. The Islamic 
University of Say, in Niger, is among those institu­
tions that have contributed to the making of a re­
gional Salafi identity while creating the conditions 
for Senegalese, Beninese, Malians, and Nigerians 
to develop affinities and alliances. As one may see 
with the Graduates of Medina (Sounaye 2015; Lo­
imeier 2012), being trained in the same institution 
creates a shared identity that overrides the mi­
cro­nationalism characteristic of the postcolonial 
states. This is illustrated by what I will call the Jos 
alumni, a network of Salafi spread across the Lake 
Chad basin and who were trained in the city of Jos, 
Nigeria, the birth place of the Izala movement.
In addition to these communities of learning, 
one of the major actors in illustrating the region­
alisation of the Salafi moral order is the preacher. 
Salafi preaching has been effective in reaching 
out and popularising religious ideas and practic­
es, and in the process shaping the local transla­
tion of the Muslim imagined community (Umma). 
The result has been the opening up of spheres of 
influence and authority for a new and younger 
generation of leaders, the restructuring of the Is­
lamic sphere (Madore 2016; Gomez 2013), and the 
constitution of various Salafi communities across 
the region (Sounaye 2016; Kobo 2015; and Iddrisu 
2012). These phenomena have all been support­
ed by practices and actors that found ways to get 
beyond borders and inspire the formation of a re­
gional Islamic sphere. One may even argue that 
the new Salafi order renders the state irrelevant, 
as we will see in the next section. More than re­
gional, the Salafi moral project is actually global, 
given the various connections averred or simply 
imagined between Salafi organisations across the 
globe (Meijer 2009). The claims of organisations 
such as al­Shebab to be the representative of al 
Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, or of Boko Haram to 
be a branch of ISIS in West Africa, support that 
point.
The issue of the moral order, as I examine it 
here, relates directly to the moral subject. What 
kind of citizen is expected to sustain and main­
tain this moral order? In other words, what kind 
of subject is needed for the society? This question 
has usually been deferred to the secular school­
ing system, an institution at the core of the moral 
fabric of the society. However, public educational 
systems have come under heavy criticism, espe­
cially in francophone context where secularism is 
usually understood as an anti­religious ideology. 
Hence the emergence of alternative learning insti­
tutions with Salafi leanings. This explains in part 
why Salafi activism has concentrated primarily on 
learning institutions and the introduction of Is­
lamic subjects in the public education curriculum. 
Against the secular system, Salafi emerged as the 
guardians of an Islamic moral order for which the 
school system is not only a major symbol, but also 
the institution any reform agenda should target. 
When governments fail to meet activists’ demand 
to reform curricula so that Islam is offered the sta­
tus they believe it deserves, a profusion of private 
learning institutions followed, transforming the 
landscape of Islamic learning (Sounaye 2016; Id­
drisu 2012; Kobo 2012; Brenner 2001).
Salafi criticism of secular schooling has empha­
sised the inability of this institution to inculcate 
the moral and political values they see as key to 
social life. Boko Haram anxieties about schooling 
and its ransacking of public schools in northern 
Nigeria, for example, denote the significance of 
this issue for the Salafi political agenda and moral 
order. But, we should be careful and point to the 
fact that the criticism leveled against schooling 
is exclusive to neither Boko Haram, nor Salafi. In 
general, Muslims have regularly criticised secu­
lar schooling because of the allegedly anti­Islamic 
values it transmits. Beyond the Islamic sphere, in 
colonial and even recent postcolonial contexts, re­
sistance to schooling was not uncommon. In North­
ern Niger, there are still communities that reject 
schooling despite the efforts by the state and de­
velopment agencies to convince them to send their 
children to school. Across West Africa it is also 
known that schooling, especially from the begin­
ning of the colonial rule, was rather for the un­
derprivileged and commoners as the nobility and 
aristocratic class rejected it. In those instances, 
schooling was perceived to be destructive, carry­
ing political subjugation and cultural extroversion 
(Hountondji 1997). Therefore, the war on secular 
schooling illustrated by cases in northern Nigeria, 
Cameroon and now along the Mali-Burkina border 
has a taste of déjà vu.
In broader terms, what is at stake is an unwanted 
cultural model Salafi fears will disorganise their 
life and dismantle their society. Similar discourses 
and views about the obligation to preserve one’s 
authenticity are found in various contexts where 
the issue has been colonisation and subjection of 
the kind Mbembe refers to in his theorisation of 
the commandement (Mbembe 2000). Obviously, 
schooling was instrumental to the colonial project 
and the modern state, its main institution; it was 
the most efficient way to produce subjects willing 
to accept the logic of the state and its vision for na­
tion­building. Understandably, for the proponents 
of a Salafi moral order, the classical public school 
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system in particular is not viable because »it de­
stroys our youth, and promote turanci« (Bachir 
Nyandu Ghana, preacher).12 In the current context, 
which finds high prestige in Arabo­Islamic cul­
ture, these convictions lead to a building spree, 
so to speak, of mosques and learning institutions 
devoted to combatting colonial imposition and pre­
venting cultural domination.
Therefore, the anti­imperialist and anti­western 
sentiments Salafism has promoted find justifica­
tion in the emancipation and authenticity agenda 
of which Boko Haram ideology has become the 
best illustration in the last ten years. Resorting 
to religious resources and arguments to set the 
ground for its anti­imperialist fight complicates 
the picture of Salafism, in particular because it 
has regularly coalesced Christianity, the West, 
and Neoliberalism. Pan­Africanist, cultural, and 
political movements across the region have often 
articulated an emancipation agenda, but most of 
the time in a rather secular way. The resort to re­
ligion and a particular religiosity is indicative of a 
turn that we should pay attention to, especially in 
a context where the state has struggled to deliver 
social services and to maintain its authority. Thus, 
the key question is not whether the state is failing 
or has failed, but what, as an institution, the state 
means to the various communities and subjects it 
is supposed to serve.
What I want to stress in this section is that 
Salafism rests on a call for nationalism which is 
not grounded in the logic of a state that portrays 
itself as a neutral institution, but in a religious dis­
course that promotes a particular vision of govern­
ance. Of course, sometimes, Salafi accommodate 
the state logic, but they also seek to repeal it in 
their search for a new moral order. Is this the sign 
that for Salafism to be so appealing and attractive, 
something must be wrong with the state and what 
it has to deliver? Not entirely.
Salafism spread so easily and became a power­
ful ideological mantra precisely because it mirrors 
a new order and offers the prospects of improve­
ment, if not materially, then at least morally. Its 
promise of a reformed moral order in line with 
people’s ideals has made it a powerful discourse 
that has transformed the moral economy of many 
communities, not only in West Africa, across the 
globe in the south, but also in the north, and even 
in parts of the world that are not traditionally 
viewed as Islamic. After all, Europe and America, 
for example, are two regions where Salafism has 
been growing and recruiting some of its staunch 
supporters (Pall 2013; Inge 2016). 
In West Africa specifically, Salafi claimed rup­
ture in contexts where, as it contends, Islam is 
12 Turanci is the Hausa word for westernisation, being 
modern. In most contexts, it is rather pejorative as it con­
notes uprootedness and loss of identity. 
forgotten and rendered insignificant. To change 
this state of affairs, they championed a reform of 
practices and institutions as the condition for the 
new and corrective order, feeding into a political 
and revolutionary agenda that aims now to remake 
the state, society, and, most importantly, the very 
principles on which governance rests. 
In that regard, Salafi criticism of secular school­
ing should not surprise. It is in line with most of 
the critiques that saw in educational institutions 
the very basis of socialisation and the making 
of a citizenry. Whether among quietist or jihadi, 
public secular schooling is still criticised for its 
incapacity to emancipate itself from Western and 
foreign values. According to this nationalism that 
takes religious forms, public education is part of a 
colonial project that intended to produce literate 
subjects, but only for bureaucratic regimes and 
norms, which actually turned out to be detrimental 
to Muslims.13 Once coopted by the regimes, these 
subjects grow into an upper-class out of touch and 
insensitive to the concerns of the broader society. 
In Hausa speaking context, this elite is referred 
to as yan boko (trained in Western education­
al institutions) or more pejoratively, yan takarda 
(those who use paperwork), in reference to the co­
lonial and state bureaucracy. Put in those terms, 
public education corrupts because it disorients. 
Hence the Salafi challenge to the modernity that 
is centered around the state and its main norm­ 
producing apparatus: public education.
The issue of the educational institution has been 
problematic for a long time in West Africa. It is 
certainly one of the recurring topics that have pre­
occupied postcolonial debates in Africa, in both 
religious and secular contexts. It is not then sur­
prising that it became a major issue among contem­
porary Salafi eager to shift to a new episteme and 
submit all knowledge to Qur’anic principles. Edu­
cation is an important target precisely because it 
is the institution through which social norms and 
structures are produced and transmitted. The fate 
of the state is somewhat set on the premises of the 
classroom. Because schooling produces subjects, 
it has become an important tool in the war against 
dependency, extroversion, and alienation. It then 
acquired a particular role and position within the 
nationalist agenda of Salafi groups, particularly 
those who systematically reduce public schools to 
vectors of westernisation.
However, while many Salafi effectively throw 
off the state/western model, many others come 
up with a middle ground position, recognising the 
value of science and promoting a school model 
that takes into consideration both the need for sci­
ence and technology, regardless of their origins, 
13 This explains why, in March and April 2017 and follow­
ing Boko Haram actions, new Jihadi groups along the Mali- 
Burkina border have targeted secular public schools.
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and the necessity to train and protect subjects 
morally. The ideal citizen in that regard should be 
learned in Islam and equipped with the knowledge 
and skills to engage the materialist, technical and 
scien tific world. Even Mohamed Yusuf, Boko Har­
am’s first ideologue, when pressed on the need for 
technology and modern science, responded: »scien­
tific knowledge is not the exclusive property of the 
West; it is given to all of us by God to use« (Yusuf, 
sermon, no title, no date). In a way, any depiction 
of Boko Haram’s ideology as a mere rejection of 
science and technology is therefore inaccurate. 
Boko Haram is not against the modernity that 
came out of science and technology, but the polit­
ical modernity that centers around the state and 
its institution; it is against a governance that secu­
larises life and impedes religiosity. Thus, perhaps 
the first response I should have given the student 
who asked, what is Boko Haram, should have been: 
which Boko Haram are you talking about?
Against the boko state: a Jihadi regime?
The social critique Salafism articulates usually 
refers to the state, depicted as an un­religious in­
stitution. In their arguments and polemics, Salafi 
have adopted contrasting and even contradictory 
positions with regard to the postcolonial state (cf. 
Khosrokhavar 2016; Elischer 2015). Amid the ero­
ding confidence in the state to assume its role and 
accomplish its mission, Salafi appeared as another 
group of critics ready for a new type of gover­
nance. They add a new layer to the ongoing debate 
about the state and its relevance. Some Salafi actu­
ally went beyond criticism to reject the postcoloni­
al secular state and replace it with a Shari’a state. 
Across the region, groups and leaders have voiced 
that option, but are yet to gain significant support. 
Is the state then in trouble? Any response to this 
question will have to take into consideration the 
need for radical transformation of state­centered 
politics, the dialectic between authen ticity and 
foreignness that shape political discourses and 
subjects today.
Salafism, I have argued, has been a game chan­
ger with a crucial structural impact, despite the 
fact that Salafi, I will quickly add, hold diverging 
views on the state as the regulator of public life. 
What role should the state play? What should be 
its source of norms? How is it to serve the common 
good? What should be its institutional make-up? 
These are major questions that have preoccupied 
Salafi in their quest to establish a new political 
order. Obviously, these issues could be approached 
beyond single and specific cases. And a compar­
ative approach is certainly needed to grasp the 
complicated and ambivalent relationship Salafi 
have developed overtime with the postcolonial 
institutions. At times, they have resorted to the 
state as they seek, for example, to »protect Islam 
against its enemies«; and at other times, they have 
rejected it altogether. As these issues stand, they 
are not only about religion, Islam, or Salafi. I read 
them as new articulations and formulations of the 
postcolonial condition on a new terrain.14
What must be underlined in this context is that 
Salafi politics have tested the state and unveiled 
many of its contradictions, contributing to the 
possibility of a Salafi­Jihadi political order of the 
kind experienced in Northern Mali and Northern 
Nigeria, especially from 2009. Like most Salafi po­
litical organisations, the goal of Boko Haram, for 
example, is to remedy what it sees as an unjust 
rule and overthrow corrupt, un­Islamic rule. The 
vicissitudes of Nigerian politics and what often 
amounts to chaotic governance have given Salafi 
reasons to promote an anti­state agenda and a 
Muslim nationalist and populist discourse. Against 
the federal state, they have usually promoted re­
sistance and opposition.
To mitigate that picture, it is worth noting that 
Salafi have also at times encouraged peaceful and 
positive engagement with political processes, urg­
ing their fellows to register for and participate in 
elections, for example. Sheikh Gumi himself has 
claimed that »Siasa tahi Salla« (participation in 
election is more important than prayer), as he tries 
to mobilise Muslims to vote and defend the inter­
est of Muslims in a federal system where they feel 
marginalised and abused. Political participation 
in that sense is crucial for the Salafi engagement 
with the state and its mode of governance.
Postcolonial West Africa is yet to experience a 
Jihadi state, but, perhaps, not for long. Less than 
two centuries ago, Jihadism was a popular ideolo­
gy which materialised in many theocracies across 
the region (Djata 1996; Echenberg 1969; Glover 
2007; Babou 2007; Curtin 1971; Last 1967; Robin­
son 2000a and 2000b). One of the most significant 
resulted in the Sokoto Caliphate, a political entity 
formed and ruled by Usman Dan Fodio and his fol­
lowers. It covered most of the territory that later 
became Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Cameroon, and Bur­
kina. The rise of a Salafism and the resurgence of 
Jihadism today understandably lead to the ques­
tion whether a Jihadi state is a political possibility. 
Considering the course of events in the last few 
decades, this is a legitimate question.
A Jihadi state may not be part of the near future, 
not only because Jihadi forces in the region lack the 
technology, the administrative personnel, and the 
infrastructure needed to establish and defend such 
an institution, but because the model of a govern ing 
body called the state in its logic and history within 
the region has not been politically convincing. Be­
yond the region, Somalia happened; Libya is still 
happening; and there is no end in sight for North­
14 Obviously, one needs more than a paper to satisfactorily 
examine that proposition.
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2012). Thus, the story of Salafism in West Africa 
has not been one of a passive acceptance of Saudi 
da’wa diplomacy. Power struggles along ideologi­
cal lines (Muslim/Christian), ethnic differences 
(Umar 2015), and regional politics (north/south), 
as well as individual aspirations, all factor in to 
shape Salafi discourse. If we lose sight of this com­
plexity, we miss significant factors that constitute 
most of the Salafi and religion­based dynamics 
driving contemporary Muslim West Africa.
Whether influenced by Saudi global ambitions 
or not, the celebration of the Jihadi state in West 
Africa resonates in many contexts as a fascination 
for a life filled with religiosity, articulated by an 
insurgent modernity, cultivated within various cir­
cles, and contributing to anti­western narratives. 
This form of boko haram is not specific to the or­
ganisation which has claimed global popularity by 
now. It relates primarily to a cultural model which 
is perceived as unfit and even dangerous for the 
state and the order its serves. One need only look 
at the debates over morality and the norms of state 
rule across the region to understand how boko 
could be portrayed as deceptive, lacking authen­
ticity, and based primarily on imported values. If 
the West has become the privileged target of the 
Salafi­Jihadi discourse in the region, it is also be­
cause first, boko has turned into the symbol of a 
deceptive modernity, and then, the westernised 
elite has become the illustration of how corrup­
tive western values could get. Boko, in that sense, 
is ruse and ambivalence, and for that reason also 
deceptive. And deception somehow engenders in­
surgency.
A critique of the society and its ideologies, 
as I have argued, Salafism is then a rejection of 
a political regime it deems perpetuating what 
Holton refers to in terms »entrenched regimes of 
inegalitarian citizenship« (2008: 4). Joining the 
widespread criticism of the postcolonial regimes, 
Salafism builds on the loss of confidence in state 
institutions. For example, in many of his sermons 
and like many other preachers in the region, Al­
bani lamented the end of trust in both political 
autho rities and state governance. Voicing the mar­
ginalisation of the north (Arewa), mostly Muslim, 
he challenged leaders to delegitimise the state 
system and open their eyes to the suffering of the 
Muslim north. His acerb criticism of leadership in 
the north earned him support among youth, mostly 
disenfranchised, but also and understandably the 
wrath of many politicians who did not hesitate to 
threaten and imprison him. In fact, in 2009, he was 
accused of being part of the Boko Haram organi­
sation, a case that sent him again to court after he 
fell out of favor with the Vice­President Namadi 
Sambo, a Muslim politician he previously helped 
get elected as Governor of Kaduna, his home state.
However, although critical of boko, Albani re­
sisted rejecting it altogether. He claimed to be dan 
ern Mali or the Lake Chad insurgency. To compli­
cate matters, Jihadism is now increasingly entan­
gled with ethnic politics, especially as managing 
resources becomes a major issue with the state. 
Perhaps, the time has arrived to rethink the state 
as an institution and to ponder the type of govern­
ance needed in many parts of that region. From 
this perspective, the Salafi challenge is not just 
about the ideology of the state, but about the state 
itself as a governing body.
The Jihadi experience in the region has been 
mainly precolonial, and originated from particular 
Islamic social formations and political configura­
tions that predated the state. For one, in the areas 
where Islam was practiced, the political order was 
organised around authorities who, although they 
took Islam as a major source of norms, were hard­
ly promoters of an Islamic moral order of the kind 
the region is experiencing today. Islamic norms 
and values were part of the resources available to 
chieftaincy and political regimes in place, but they 
were less significant than today and certainly not 
the primary references. 
Reading Sufi dynamics in the 19th century, one 
may argue that what made their appeal is precise­
ly their new discourse and a reform narrative that 
became the main framework within which peo­
ple articulated emancipation, aspiration for so­
cial progress, and becoming. Offering alternative 
paths and visions of the political and moral order, 
the Sufi reform received wide support and eventu­
ally became the discourse of a revolution (Lovejoy 
2016; Robinson 2000b). Whether this revolution 
was coming from organisations or figures inspired 
by Sufism didn’t matter. However, their alterna­
tive character and the promises they had for a new 
order, expected to be lawful, just, and in service to 
the common good, did matter. It mattered also that 
they were part of an organised ideological struc­
ture that relied on Islam to overthrow an order.
Today, the proponents of Jihadism are neither 
Sufi nor followers of tariqa, but Salafi. That is, 
they are mainly anti­Sufi, who build on an Islamic 
reform discourse that looks primarily toward Sau­
di Arabia for institutional and political support, 
but is ideologically grounded in ideas and values 
modeled by the Prophetic era. Furthermore, socio­
logically, as they rely on youth movements and 
organisations, they have redefined the modes of 
production of authority.15 Saudi invested billions to 
help Salafism win souls and dominate the religious 
sphere by training West Africans and setting up 
educational infrastructures; but there have been 
also local and independent trends of active appro­
priation that often had nothing to do with Saudi 
intervention (Kobo 2013; Iddrissu 2012; Sounaye 
15 Youth’s agency in this process has taken over that of any 
other segment of the society.
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region a specific course. It is an internal process 
that finds inspiration in moments and figures that 
mark the history of the region. The Salafi da’wa 
has been a major factor in this revolution. It has 
relied on three types of actors: the Salafi move­
ment, the Salafi group/organisation, and the Salafi 
entrepreneur, all players that seek to create a new 
moral order primarily based on what they perceive 
as the original message of Islam.
The influence Salafism has acquired in Muslim 
West Africa can be also explained by an unprece­
dented social demand for religion and religiosity. 
The idea that religiosity functions only for a pri­
vate subject doesn’t tell the story of the recent re­
ligion­related developments in the world and West 
Africa. While many refer to this phenomenon in 
terms of resurgence, it is important to note that 
in many cases, the drive is not only private and 
personal; it is also very much public and often part 
of a quest for social status and position. It is politi­
cal, communal and entrepreneurial. What matters 
then is not necessarily that people are religious.
Furthermore, the demand for religion has also 
led to a diversification of the offer, so to speak. 
Religious organisations have not only multiplied, 
they have also become more creative in their ap­
proach to the public and religious subject. They 
have engineered social formations that respond to 
the need to be part of a group, a community, or a 
collective. Jihadi organisations such as Boko Har­
am, Ansar Dine, MUJAO and the Front de Libéra­
tion du Macina are again good illustrations of this 
mode, especially when one takes into considera­
tion the role ethnicity played in their emergence. 
Within that context, what is at stake, as several 
Jihadi organisations in the region have shown, is 
the future of the state as a social and political in­
stitution, but also as a site and a pretext of politi­
cal culture.
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